November 4, 2024 ☼ The Intersection ☼ geopolitics ☼ Indo-Pacific ☼ China ☼ defence
Diplomacy and military preparedness should go hand-in-hand in dealing with a disdainful China
This is from The Intersection column that appears every other Monday in Mint.
The four year long Galwan phase of India-China relations has come to an end. The two countries struck an agreement last week to disengage militarily and resolve “the issues in these areas.” If the deal is implemented seriously, it could be the first step of a slow and wary movement towards better ties in the next phase of the relationship. India’s best approach is to be cautiously optimistic without letting heady optimism overpower the caution, especially in the short term.
There are many lessons to learn from the Galwan phase. The two most important are the following. First, Beijing can achieve small boundary-related objectives by conducting aggressive military operations short of war. Second, that the asymmetric emotional significance of the border conflict is disadvantageous to India’s interests. Let me explain.
Why did Beijing raise the heat at Galwan in May 2020? The proximate answer is to prevent India from building road infrastructure in areas near the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Those roads would have subtly changed the military balance in India’s favour. My China specialist colleagues feel that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leadership did not expect the Indian Army to respond as forcefully as they did. The PLA’s bosses in Beijing too underestimated New Delhi’s political response, and did not foresee roll out of hardline political and economic measures in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic. Beijing paid a tremendous geopolitical cost for its miscalculation: the Indian establishment acquired “strategic clarity” with respect to China and drew even closer to the United States.
The price was much higher that it estimated, but to the extent that Beijing managed to prevent or slow down Indian infrastructure development along the Line of Control, it has achieved its objective. India’s road construction projects would have progressed significantly over the past four years had the PLA not intervened. Moreover, we do not know what the Kazan agreement entails for infrastructure building and how it will affect the military balance. From a purely military point of view, the PLA will conclude that aggression is effective in pursuing its territorial objectives, albeit at a high strategic cost.
There is an asymmetry in the emotional significance of affairs along the Himalayan frontiers. It does not play the same way in Chinese and Indian public opinion. Incidents along the Line of Control, in Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh are felt more intensely in India, reported more passionately by the Indian media and result in political pressure on the Indian government. Unlike Narendra Modi, Xi Jinping does not have to face criticism from opposition politicians. This puts the Indian government in an uncomfortable spot. Fanned by excited media, public opinion favours a stronger military response, but conflict escalation over remote Himalayan terrain involves bigger political risks. This emotional asymmetry enables China’s political leaders to use the border to destabilise Indian policy.
The Kazan agreement allows China’s political and military leaders to retain their belief that military options are useful. At the same time, I think they will assess that the strategic costs of doing are extravagant. Was a favourable military balance in a couple of sectors of the Himalayan frontiers worth pushing India into the arms of the United States, freezing hugely profitable economic ties and convincing a whole generation of Indians that China is the enemy? China’s leaders are nothing if not a pragmatic lot and I suspect there has been some rethinking going on in Beijing.
One reason the Galwan phase started was because of the Chinese leadership’s imperial disdain for countries it doesn’t consider a world power. They didn’t expect the Indian reaction and its geopolitical consequences because they underestimate the power of their big neighbours. Their fixation with the United States means that they are blinkered when it comes to India, Japan and Vietnam. Unfortunately, I suspect that the imperial disdain is part of China’s political culture, of its Middle Kingdom mindset, and that it clouds a clearer strategic assessment.
Where do we go from here? The Kazan agreement is an opportunity. If both sides execute it in good faith, it can be the basis of rebuilding diplomatic and economic ties. As details of the deal unfold, we are likely to see concessions and compromises that we do not like. Once the disengagement is considered complete, the tricky business of “resolution of issues” will begin. It is unlikely to be easy. Yet it is better to have officials negotiating with each other on a regular basis than persist with a situation where the two governments have frozen each other off.
As I have argued for a long time, it is in India’s interests to shift the theatre of strategy away from the Himalayas and into the waters of the Indo-Pacific. Once India shows itself inclined and capable of affecting the maritime military balance east of Malacca, the PLA will recalculate the utility of force along the Line of Actual Control. And the emotional asymmetry will be to Beijing’s disadvantage. As the Galwan phase has reminded us again, power is the only language China’s leaders understand.
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