July 14, 2024 ☼ The Intersection ☼ national security ☼ public policy
Some basic principles in the design of the national security advisor's office and eco-system
This is an unedited draft from The Intersection column that appears every other Monday in Mint.
Writing in the Indian Express last Monday, Sanjaya Baru, former media advisor to PM Manmohan Singh, drew attention to the appointment of a new Additional National Security Advisor and restructuring of the reporting relationships among top officials and institutions responsible for national security management. Baru writes that “The absence of any clearly laid out criteria and qualifications for the post and, worse, clearly specified duties and chain of command, has left the question open as to who should be made NSA — a diplomat, a spook, a soldier or a scholar?”
Yes, ‘scholarly’ sounds pompous. But I think it’s accurate. I’m really engaged in policy analysis here, not commentary.
Let me carry the conversation forward from a scholarly perspective of a non-partisan outsider. I am not concerned with which individual is appointed to which office or which service gains an advantage. Similarly, I do not want to make off-hand recommendations on how national security setup can be restructured. Rather, I want to restate the principles that will make the NSA, NSCS, defence and intelligence organisations more effective.
The most important principle is that the NSA must enjoy the confidence and trust of the Prime Minister. This means that the Prime Minister should be unconstrained in the choice. Given the importance of the NSA’s role, prime ministers have a natural incentive in ensuring that job goes to a highly competent person.
Let me go further and make a point that some will find uncomfortable: if the prime minister feels ideological and political inclinations of the NSA are relevant, then that is his prerogative. The NSA is accountable to parliament and public through the Prime Minister.
Second, the NSA should remain an advisor and not have operational or command responsibilities. Operations should be carried out by intelligence or security forces through their respective chain of command. This will ensure that the operations are carried out by organisations that have the mandate, resources and expertise, while shielding the political leadership for legitimate reasons. The NSA is not an operational shortcut and should not be treated as it is one.
Third, the rank assigned to the office of the NSA need not be fixed. Its current occupant has been given cabinet rank, but previous NSAs have been of Minister-of-State and principal secretary rank. These differences have caused perplexity in the top ranks of government officials, but they have adapted as best as they can. Arvind Gupta, a former Deputy NSA, writes in his book that “At the best of times, the NSA and other functionaries work together on key issues of national security. On other occasions, he works independently. The NSA can very much define his role.” Whatever the rank, the NSA’s power derives from his relationship with the Prime Minister. So does his effectiveness. Establishment insiders might have a different view on this, but I think the Prime Minister should have the flexibility in assigning the rank he deems appropriate.
Fourth, it is best that the office of the NSA remain outside the turf of any and all branches of the civil service. It is perhaps the only such position at the top level of government that is not captured by a service. We have had former IAS, IFS and IPS officers becoming NSAs and it is important that the openness remain in place. Indeed, it should be possible for capable individuals from outside the government to be appointed to the role. Of course, it will be extremely hard for an outsider to operate effectively in what is the most secretive part of the establishment. Sometimes, though, an outsider is just what secretive establishments need.
Fifth, it is the NSA who should do the prime minister’s daily security briefings. The appointment of another security advisor (internal or additional) should not change the accountability equation. At the same time the additional NSA, Chief of Defence Staff, the three service chiefs, future theatre commanders and the intelligence chiefs should have direct access to the Prime Minister when they require. These arrangements make the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister a crucial player in the smooth functioning of the national security system.
Finally, as Baru points out, the duties of the various officials and instutitions and chain of command have to be clearly specified. Any security system faces its real test during crises, during which both informal working arrangements and formal lines of responsibility play an important role. The controversies around the official response during the Kargil war, IC-814 hijacking and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks demonstrate this point. Now, with the growing relevance of cybersecurity, the institution of the CDS system and the prospective creation of theatre commands, the complexity of the national security eco-system has grown by orders of magnitude compared to 2008 when the the terrorist attack took place. All the more reason for greater clarity of thought and judgement.
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